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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Minimum Wage is a controversial policy. And all the more so in Spain 
a country which holds the dubious honour of having the largest unemployment rate 
in the OECD, namely, 22.9% in 1996 and where 2,2 million jobs where destroyed 
between 1974 and 1985. Together with other labour market rigidities (generous 
unemployment benefits, high firing costs, etc.) minimum wages are singled out as 
one of the culprits of this unfortunate outcome. 
The current system of minimum wages in Spain, the Salario Minimo 
Interprofesional (SMI) was introduced in 1963, replacing an earlier system in which 
minimum wage varied by region and age. It is a statutory minimum wage set by the 
government in consultation with trade unions and employer organisations. It currently 
sets one rate for workers aged 18 or over and for those aged 16-17, though prior to 
1990 it had set different rates for 16 year olds, with special rates for homeworkers 
and casual/temporary workers. At the start of 1994, apprenticeship contracts were 
introduced for workers under the age of 25 which could pay below the minimum 
wage. The percentage of workers at or close to the minimum was about 5 % in 1994 
and about 2 % of workers were in schemes paying below the SMI. Although this 
proportion may not look sizeable, a number of welfare benefits are linked to the 
minimum wage. 
The Kaitz indices are nowadays about 35 % and 55 % for adult and youth 
minimum wages, respectively and have been trending downwards along the sample 
period' (see Fig. 1). An exception is the change in youth rates in 1990 which 
produced a very large rise in the minimum wages for teenagers, with an 83 % 
increase for 16 year olds and a 15% for 17 year olds. A detailed analysis of this 
episode and the overall employment effects of minimum wages since their 
introduction can be found in Dolado et al. (1996). As in many other European 
countries, a major difficulty with assessing the impact of the minimum wage on 
Spanish employment is that there is a national minimum wage that has not varied 
much in relation to average earnings. In any case, it is difficult to argue that the 
minimum wage is responsible for the high level of Spanish unemployment since, as 
far as the adult rate is concerned, the Kaitz index is currently at a historical 
minimum. 
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In Dolado et al. (1996) we exploit the minimum wage variation over time and 
study its relative impact on low-wage/high-wage industries and regions. We find, in 
particular, that the rise of the youth minimum in 1990 reduced the employment of 
youths and increased slightly overall employment. The most plausible explanation for 
the employment effect on older workers is substitution of employers away from 
younger wwkers who had become relatively more expensive and, on top of that, 
some monopsonistic effects. In spite of the fact that results are in line with the recent 
evidence on the effects of minimum wages across the Atlantic, it is natural to try 
to reconcile them with the results of Card (1992) who found a weakly positive effect 
of the rise in the federal minimum wage in the US in the early 1990s on teenage 
employment. This is so since the rise in the Spanish youth minimum led to a rise in 
the Kaitz index from slightly over 0.3 to 0.55 whereas the change in the US was 
from 0.75 to 0.85. One possible explanation is that whereas the minimum wage is 
virtually the only wage floor for teenage workers in the US, it has an important 
influence on higher wage floors in Spain. Some evidence supportive of this view 
comes from the survey "Collective Bargaining in Large Firms" for 1985 and 1994. 
The ratio of the wage of labourers (the lowest skill category) to the wage of workers 
aged 16 and 17 fell from 1. 83 in 1985 to 1. 31 in 1994. As these negotiated wages 
are generally above the minimum, this suggest that the rise in the relative wages of 
youths may have had a considerable impact on the wages of young workers paid 
above the minimum. 
In this paper we want to tackle this issue in greater depth. Specifically, we 
want to analyze how collective wage bargaining in Spain, by fixing minimum wages 
above the statutory ones, affects the overall wage structure3• Since these wages are 
only minimum wages at the provincial industrywide level, and informal agreements 
between firm and worker are legally recognised, we expect these facts to limit the 
union's expected compression of the earning distribution, giving rise to higher wages 
even for those workers not directly affected by the guaranteed minimum wages. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop a 
simple model with monopsonistic features where firms' interaction in the product 
market, resulting in externalities in wage-setting, may give rise to wider wage 
dispersion than that implied by the introduction of minimum wages. In section 3, we 
use information on the guaranteed and reported hourly wages for a cross-section of 
workers in 1990 to empirically test the previous conjecture, by means of the 
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approach advocated by Meyer and Wise (1983 a, b). Finally, section 4 draws some 
concluding remarks. 
2. A MODEL OF WAGE DISPERSION WITH MONOPSONISTIC 
FEATURES 
We now present a simple model of monopsonistic competition where firms 
with different characteristics compete for workers who evaluate wage offers 
differently4. There are two types of firm competing in a single market for a 
homogenous product. Some firms are of type H, having high productivity, while 
others are of type L, having low productivity. The firm's output is given by the 
production function: 
(i = H, L) (1) 
where Yi = output, Li = labour, Ai = index of technical progress and 0 < a < 1. The 
number of firms is fixed and capital has been eliminated from (1), assuming a given 
price and interest rate, by means of the first order condition of profits with respect 
to capital. Workers' labour supply is given by: 
L j == (W/ W)'Y W~ (2) 
-
where ~ =wage and W== reservation wage. Equation (2) can be interpreted as 
jobs in different firms having some non-wage characteristics, e.g. distance, giving 
each employer some monopsonistic power. If the labour market is perfectly 
competitive then )'=0. If 1/;=0, although an individual firm can raise its labour 
supply by raising its wage, this is entirely at the expense of other firms. We will 
assume in what follows that)' > 1/; > O. 
Firms act as price takers in the product market, facing a price which is 
normalised to unity, and choose Wi to maximise profits: 
(3) 
The first order condition with respect to the wage, yields the following firm 
i's optimal wage as a function of W 
(4) 
with 
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Ct = [in a + at - In (1 + ')') / ')']/[l+')'(l-a)] 
d = (1 - a) (I' - 1/;) / [1 + I' (1 - a)] 
where small letters denote logs of capital ones and 0 < d < 1. Notice that, since 
aH > aL, CH> CL and H type firms pay higher wages than L type firms. Thus, the 
firm's optimal wage is an increasing function of the reservation wage. Next, we 
assume that the reservation wage is a weighted combination of the optimal wages wH 
and WL, namely, 
WH = CH + d [AWH + (1 - A) wL] 
wL = CL + d [(1 - A) wH + AWL] 
(5) 
(6) 
with 0 < A < 1. The interpretation of (5) and (6) is that H type (L type) firms compete 
with a given proportion of L type (H type) firms. In this way, we encompass two 
extreme cases. When A=l, firms only compete with those of their own class (no 
interaction), whilst A=O implies that firms only compete with those of the other class 
(full interaction). Notice that wages in both types of firm are strategic complements 
in the standard terminology introduced by Bulow et al. (1985). Nash equilibrium 
wages are given by: 
W~ = [(1 - dA) CH + d(1 - A) CL] / 0 
wl = [d(l - A) CH + (1 - dA) CL] / 0 
(7) 
(8) 
where (2 = (l-dAf - d2(1-A)2> O. Notice that the higher is A, the higher is w~ and 
the lower is WL*' so that wage dispersion, measured by the wage differential, 
becomes: 
(9) 
which is an increasing function of A, i.e. it is larger under no interaction 
( = (l-dy' (CH -CL » than under full interaction ( = (1 +dY' (CH -CL », an effect 
which stems from the strategic complementarity between firms in setting wages. 
As regards employment, substituting the reservation wage into (2) yields 
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lH = 'YWH + (I' - 1/;) [f..WH + (1-f..) WL] (10) 
lL = 'YWL + (I' - 1/;) [(1 - f..) WH + f..WL] (11) 
so that as f.. increases IL increases and IH decreases. Notice, however, that total 
employment, given by the sun, of IH and IL' is independent of f.., namely: 
I = (1_d)-1 1/; (CH + CL) (12) 
Now, consider the introduction of a minimum wage (wm) starting at w~. On the one 
hand, under no interaction the wage paid by L type firms increases one-for-one 
whereas the wage paid by H type firms, for which Wm is not binding, does not raise. 
On the other hand, under full interaction, the same happens with L type firms, but 
now H type firms increase their wages by an amount d, according to their reaction 
function (5). So, in both cases there is a reduction in wage dispersion, but to a 
smaller extent under full interaction. Thus, the smaller is f.., the smaller will be the 
reduction in wage dispersion as a consequence of the introduction of a minimum 
wage which only binds for L-type firms. 
Finally, it is easy to prove that minimum wages hurt the profits of both types 
of firm. The fall in profits for L type firms is larger the larger is f.. and the fall in 
profits for H type firms in larger the lower is f... Hence, under full interaction both 
types of firm see their profits fall because H type firms suffer a decrease in their 
labour supply due to a rise in their competitors' wages. Obviously, the assumption 
of a given number of firms is not harmless since, as profits fall, entry and exit will 
surely affect the degree of interaction between firms and the employment effects of 
minimum wages. However, a formal analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1. The Data 
In order to examine the consequences of minimum wages on wage dispersion, 
we use a subsample of the Class Structure, Consciousness and Biography Survey, 
which provides information about work conditions for 6632 individuals between 
December 1990 and March 1991. We have been able to obtain a final subsample 
including 491 wage earners who reported both their labour earnings and enough 
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information about their professional status, and for whom we could determine their 
minimum agreed wages in collective bargaining at the sector-level which were in 
force in November 1990. 
For those individuals we have information on two types of agreed wages. So, 
the "guaranteed hourly wage" (hereafter GHW) can be define,"i as the guaranteed 
minimum wage for all individuals with a particular professional status in an ordinary 
working day. Besides, the "guaranteed hourly wage according to seniority and 
overtime work" (hereafter GHWSO) includes seniority premia and overtime work 
rewards5 • Finally, the quoted survey gives us information about the "reported hourly 
wages" (hereafter RHW). The chosen subsample corresponds to six major industrial 
sectors and the construction sector, industries where about 90% of workers are 
covered by a collective agreement. 
In Table 1, means and coefficients of variation of GHW, GHWSO and RHW 
are reported by levels of skill and professional status. The most important 
observation is that agreed minimum wages are not binding for the highly skilled and 
skilled workers, whereas the relative gap between RHW and GHWSO reported in 
the last column is very low. Furthermore, GHW and GHWSO dispersions are 
positively related to the category level, which again can be interpreted as a signal 
that the standard-rate policy is more significant for the low and semi-skilled workers 
than for the higher skilled workers and for blue-collar than for white-collar workers. 
It is also noticeable that the mean agreed wages for the lower skill categories is about 
65% above the national statutory minimum wage. However, given the size of the 
coefficients of variation for the lower skill categories, there is also evidence of 
frequent non-compliance among semi-skilled and unskilled workers. In this respect, 
using evidence on the determinants of agreed and reported wages, Felgueroso (1995) 
shows that one of the most important factors behind the "black labour market" 
segment is the extension of the daily work journey without being paid. 
3.2. Estimation of Wage Gains 
Once we have presented evidence favouring the hypothesis that agreed wages 
are mostly binding for the lower skill and professional categories, we consider their 
impact on wages using the concept of "wage gain" due to sectoral agreements. 
According to Lewis' (1986) terminology, the "wage gain" in this context would be 
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defined as the difference between the current wage and the one the worker would 
receive in a hypothetical economy with no industry wide bargaining. 
Given that only cross-sectional data are available, we follow a variant of the 
approach developed by Meyer and Wise (1983 a,b) to study the US minimum wage 
t'ilects on wage and employment distributions. This procedure will enable us to 
compare expected earnings of individuals, had not there been sectoral agreements, 
with their actual reported earnings. 
Suppose that, in the absence of sectoral minimum wages, the hourly wage that 
the i-th individual would receive is Wnj • This underlying market wage is not 
observable and is assumed to be determined by 
(13) 
where X j is a vector of individual and labour market characteristics. As regards the 
error term, we use a heteroskedastic version of the Meyer and Wise' model thereby 
assuming that 
(14) 
where Zj is vector of variables determining the variance of uj • Next, let us assume 
that the employment status in the underlying market is defined by 
(15) 
where i j is an indicator function such that i j > 0 if the i-th individual is employed 
and i j = 0 otherwise. The error term E j is assumed to be i. i. d (0, 1). 
Now suppose that a minimum wage is set for the i-th individual in 
industrywide bargaining at level W mj and that firms take it as exogenous. Some 
workers, who in the absence of the minimum wage would be paid a wage below, are 
presumed to receive W mi with probability PI' Others, with probability P 2, shall 
continue to be paid below W mi because of noncompliance. The remaining 
sub minimum workers are presumed to lose their job with probability I-PI-P2 • 
Further assumptions are that labour supply is constant, that Uj and Ej are 
uncorrelated and that there are not spillovers on wages perceived by workers with 
an underlying market wage above W mi' Moreover, in practice we consider that the 
minimum wage corresponding to each worker belongs to a small interval [W mli> 
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W m2J. Then, we can classify each individual in the sample into one of the following 
four groups: [1] individuals for whom the observed wage (W) is larger than W m2' 
i.e., Wj>Wm2j; [2] equal to minimum, i.e., Wmli,,:;;,Wj,,:;;,Wm2j; [3] lesser that the 
minimum, i.e., Wj<Wmlj; and [4] individual is unemployed, i.e., Wj=O. 
Defining the normalised v,,:iates 
W i = (In Wi - ao - Xi a I) / ('Y + Zi 0) 
and 
where 0 and cl> are the standarised normal density and cumulative functions, 
respectively, and taking only data for employed individuals into account, the 
observed wages can be classified into three classes in terms of their underlying wage 
distribution, with the following probabilities: 
Pr [1] 1 0(w) 
hi (W) = = 
1-P
r 
[4] ai D 
Pr [3] cl>[wm2J - cl>[Wmli] (1-P2) 
1-P
r 
[4] D 
Pr [2] 1 o (w)PI h3 (W) = 
1-Pr [4] at D 
if W I' < W, m I I 
where D= 1-cl> [Wmli] (I-Pe P2) is a common denominator which can be interpreted 
as the probability that an individual employed in the underlying market remains 
employed after the introduction of minimum wages. The numerators, in turn, 
represent the probability a worker initially employed has an observed wage above, 
equal or below the minimum wage, respectively. 
Using a maximum likelihood procedure we can obtain estimates for ao, ai' 
'Yo, 'YI' PI and P2 by maximising the log-likelihood function: 
n, n, N 
L = L in hi (W) + L in h2 (W) + L in h3 (W) (16) 
i=1 i=n,+1 i=n,+1 
From these estimates the "wage gain" due to industry wide minimum wage for 
the i-th employed worker is defined by: 
8 
Gi = [exp (w) / exp (wni)] -1 (17) 
where w. = E [In W.] = ao + x. a1 and w. = E [In W.] which is obtained nl nl I I I 
through weighting the predicted wage in each segment by their corresponding 
probabilities hi'S. 
3.3. Results 
Estimates of the parameters in the previous model are shown in Table 2, 
using job tenure and its square and dummies for skill levels, gender, sector and 
professional category as the elements of Xi' and schooling as the only element of 
Zi6 • Column (1) reports the OLS estimates of the observed wage function (RHR). 
Column (2) presents the homoscedastic version of the model with 0=0. Finally, 
column (3) reports estimates from the heteroskedastic version. A simple LR test for 
the null hypothesis 0=0 rejects homoskedasticity at very low significance levels7 • 
Thus, comparing columns (1) and (3), as expected, the estimated returns to skill 
level, job tenure, as well as inter-industry wage differences and the relative wage of 
white-collar workers would be higher in the underlying market. On the other hand, 
the estimated variance of underlying wages is larger than that of observed wages, a 
result which is consistent with the expected earning compression stemming from 
industry wide bargaining. 
The estimates of PI and P 2 indicate that the probability that an individual with 
an underlying market wage below the corresponding minimum wage will lose his job 
is very small in the homoskedastic version of the model and about 10% in the 
heteroskedastic one. This probability, however, is higher for workers with low job 
tenure, a result which is consistent with the slightly negative effects on youth 
employment discussed in the Introductions. 
The estimated industrywide "wage gains" are presented in Table 3. They tend 
to be higher for lower skill workers, blue-collar and low tenure workers. However, 
consistently with the prediction of the model is section 2, higher skill and white-
collar workers still get substantial increases, weakening the "sword of justice" effect 
(wage compression) of unions in Spain. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents evidence on the consequences of sectoral bargaining 
agreements on minimum agreed wages in the spanish industry. For this purpose, 
individual reported hourly wages have been compared with those agreed in sectoral 
barg8 ;ning for a subsample of workers taken from a spanish labour force survey in 
1990. We find that agreed wages are binding, in general, only for semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers. Furthermore, the classification of workers into three groups 
(regarding whether their reported wages are greater, equal 0 lesser than their 
corresponding agreed wages) allows us to estimate industry wide bargaining "wage 
gains" for different groups of workers, following Meyer and Wise' approach. In 
agreement with our theoretical predictions, we find that 'wage gains' are larger for 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers but they are also sizeable for higher skill workers. 
Furthermore, agreed wages are well above the statutory minimum wages for the 
lower categories. Both features may well jeopardise the employment prospects of 
youth and weaken the "sword of justice" effect of trade unionism in Spain. 
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1. kad is the adult Kaitz index; k17 the Kaitz index for 17 year-olds and k16 the Kaitz index for 
those aged less than 170 .' . 
TABLE 1 
Guaranteed and Reported Hourly Wages 
GHW I GHWSO I RHW I (RHW IGHWSO) - 1 
-, 
avg. c.v. avg. c.v. avg. c.v. avg. 
(pts.) (%) (pts.) (%) (pts.) (%) (%) 
All workers 546.2 23.4 583.0 24.8 733.2 57.7 22.5 
High skilled 724.5 21.0 791.4 20.7 1245.3 51.2 573 
Skilled 536.3 14.5 573.3 14.2 717.9 35.6 25.2 
Semi-skilled 476.2 12.0 497.7 14.0 497.7 28.9 0.4 
Unskilled 462.7 12.0 482.8 13.5 480.3 26.5 03 
White-collar 645.8 24.3 690.2 25.5 1021.4 58.2 45.0 
Blue-collar 503.4 15.0 537.0 17.0 606.1 35.3 12.4 
Note: avg. = mean; c. v. = coefficient of variation. 
Variables 
Constant 
High-skilled 
Skilk'l 
Unskilled 
Tenure 
Tenure (**2) 
Gender 
Sector 1 
Sector 2 
Sector 3 
Sector 4 
Sector 5 
Sector 6 
Blue-collar 
PI 
P2 
Variance Equation 
Constant 
School 
Log-lik. 
No.obs. 
TABLE 2 
Parameter Estimates 
O.W.F. 
(OLS) 
6.11 
(0.09) 
0.46 
(0.06) 
0.18 
(0.05) 
-0.19 E-02 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.20 E-02 
(0.13 E-02) 
-0.22 
(0.04) 
-0.16 
(0.07) 
-0.08 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.26 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.21 
(0.07) 
-0.32 
(0.04) 
0.311 
491 
U.W.F. (I) 
(MLE) 
6.43 
(0.07) 
0.66 
(0.07) 
0.29 
(0.06) 
-0.27 E-02 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.23 E-02 
(0.19 E-02) 
-0.22 
(0.05) 
-.19 
(0.08) 
-0.17 
(0.05) 
-0.22 
(0.07) 
-0.39 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.24 
(0.08) 
-0.26 
(0.05) 
0.44 
(0.09) 
0.55 
(0.16) 
0.346 
-367.4 
491 
U.W.F. (11) 
(MLE) 
6.40 
(0.07) 
0.57 
(0.07) 
0.27 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.23 E-02 
(0.19 E-02) 
-0.20 
(0.05) 
-0.21 
(0.08) 
-0.15 
(0.04) 
-0.16 
(0.07) 
-0.33 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.26 
(0.10) 
-0.26 
(0.05) 
0.39 
(0.07) 
0.49 
(0.10) 
0.19 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.33 E-02) 
0.339 
-355.0 
491 
Note: O.W.F.: observed wage function; U.W.F. (I): underlying wage function (homoskedastic version; 
U.W.F. (11) : underlying wage function (heteroskedastic version). Standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
computed from covariance of analytic first derivatives. 
OLS: ordinary least squares; MLE: maximum likelihood estimation. 
TABLE 3 
Industrywide Bargaining Wage Gains 
Workf, Wage Gain 
"~ 
All workers 6.21 
Highly skilled 2.55 
Skilled 8.01 
Semi-skilled 1232 
Unskilled 11.67 
White-collar 3.65 
Blue-collar 7.55 
High tenure 5.13 
Low tenure 9.76 
Note: The wage gains have been computed using parameter estimates of 
model U.W.F. (11). 
